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Abstract
A central finding of the modern labor market literature is that labor supply responses tend to
be concentrated along the extensive margin (labor force participation) rather than the
intensive margin (hours of work). Yet, the literature on the marginal cost of public funds
(MCF) focuses solely on the intensive margin. In this paper we demonstrate that it is
important to incorporate extensive labor supply responses into the analysis. Firstly, MCF
becomes a function of average taxes, rather than just marginal taxes. Secondly, participation
decisions and thus MCF depend on the magnitude of transfers for those out of work. Our
calculations for 23 OECD countries reveal that the MCF becomes substantially higher once
the participation e.ect is accounted for. This is especially the case for continental European
countries where average taxes are high and benefit systems are generous.
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Research Foundation.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The optimal size of government is a central concern to anyone interested in the economics of
the public sector. The classic formulation of the problem goes back to Samuelson (1954) who
analyzed the case where government is ﬁnanced entirely by lump sum taxation. His analysis
was later reﬁned by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974) to account
for the more realistic situation where revenue has to be raised by distortionary taxation. These
papers demonstrated that a crucial factor for the optimal size of government is the marginal
welfare cost of raising revenue by distortionary taxes, subsequently labelled the marginal cost
of public funds (MCF) by Browning (1976).
The contribution by Browning and the literature that followed have discussed how to mea-
sure the MCF and tried to estimate its value for the United States. The literature has focused
mostly on the eﬀect of taxation on labor supply, e.g. Stuart (1984), Browning (1987), Fullerton
(1991), Mayshar (1991), Ballard and Fullerton (1992), Snow and Warren (1996), and Dahlby
(1998). Speciﬁcally, the model of labor supply employed in these papers deals exclusively with
the eﬀect of taxes on hours of work for those who are working. The decision of whether or not
to enter the labor market is not included in the analysis. This is at variance with the modern
labor market literature which emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between labor sup-
ply responses along the intensive margin (hours of work) and the extensive margin (labor force
participation):
“A revision is in order for George Stigler’s dictum that all elasticities are 1 in absolute
value. A dictum closer to the truth would be that elasticities are closer to 0 than 1 for
hours-of-work equations (or weeks-of-work equations) estimated for those who are working.
A major lesson of the past 20 years is that the strongest empirical eﬀects of wages and
nonlabor income on labor supply are to be found at the extensive margin — at the margin
of entry and exit — where the elasticities are deﬁnitely not zero.” Heckman (1993, p. 118).
1The distinction between hours of work and participation, stressed so clearly in the above
statement, seems to be important for the welfare cost of taxation. Firstly, participation decisions
depend on the average — rather than the marginal — rate of taxation. This introduces a role
for average taxes in the determination of MCF, unlike the traditional measures emphasizing
the eﬀect of marginal taxes on working hours. Secondly, the choice to participate in the labor
market is inﬂuenced by outside opportunities, implying that transfers for those out of work (like
UI beneﬁts, social assistance, housing beneﬁts, food stamps, etc.) play a role for the magnitude
of the MCF. The fact that entry-exit behavior constitutes most of the observed variation in
labor supply serves to make these theoretical points all the more important.
Against this background, we generalize the MCF measure to account for both margins of
labor supply response. We then calculate the revised MCF for 23 OECD countries. The revised
MCF includes the standard term, operating through the intensive margin, and an additional
term which works through the extensive margin. The new term depends on the level of average
taxes and transfers as well as the elasticity of participation with respect to the after tax wage
rate. The presence of extensive labor supply responses unambiguously increases the welfare
cost of raising additional tax revenue.
To estimate MCF, we use OECD data on taxes and beneﬁts for the average production
worker in each country. The inclusion of beneﬁts raises some conceptual issues. The replacement
rates reported by OECD may be overestimated for our purpose because of eligibility rules
(relating to wealth, spouse’s income, etc.) and because of various forms of workfare requirements
which reduce the utility of the beneﬁt recipient. To avoid this potential bias, we present two
estimates of the MCF: one where beneﬁts are excluded altogether (a lower bound) and another
one which is based on the lowest beneﬁt measure reported by OECD, namely that of a long-term
2recipient.
A benchmark case emphasized in the literature, for example by Ballard and Fullerton (1992),
is where the additional revenue is raised by a proportional tax and where the uncompensated
hours-of-work elasticity is equal to zero. The ‘standard’ MCF measure is equal to one in
this case.1 The revised MCF, on the other hand, is always greater than one resulting from
the participation eﬀect. For a macro participation elasticity equal to 0.2—ac o n s e r v a t i v e
estimate presumably — the MCF for the various countries lies in the interval from 1.15 to 2.52
if government transfers are included, while the interval is 1.09 to 1.80 without transfers. At the
low end of the scale, United States has a beneﬁt-inclusive MCF equal to 1.15 while the beneﬁt-
exclusive value is 1.13. Other countries with relatively low MCFs include Japan, Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom. In the high end, we have continental European countries
such as Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. For example,
the MCF for Germany is equal to 1.55 or 2.12 depending on whether beneﬁts are included or
not.
The paper also investigates the possibility of Laﬀer curve eﬀects. By construction, the MCF
tends to inﬁnity as the economy approaches the maximum of the Laﬀer curve and becomes
negative thereafter. Our sensitivity analysis for the participation elasticity implies that this
could happen for some European countries, even for proportional tax changes where the stan-
dard MCF would be one. For a participation elasticity equal to 0.4, our analysis indicates that
countries like Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands have beneﬁt-inclusive MCFs in excess of
10, while Germany and Belgium are beyond the Laﬀer curve’s maximum.
1Aq u a l i ﬁcation is in order here. The standard MCF is equal to one in the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern
approach, where the additional revenue is allocated to a public good which has no repercussions on labor supply.
In the Pigou-Harberger-Browning tradition, on the other hand, government spending is assumed to neutralize
any income eﬀects of the tax change, implying that the MCF is always greater than one. See Wildasin (1984)
and Ballard and Fullerton (1992) for detailed discussions of this issue.
3The relation of our paper to the existing literature may be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways.
In a literal interpretation, the literature deals only with the intensive margin of labor supply
response, while our paper incorporates the margin of entry and exit into the analysis. The
presence of this additional margin of labor supply response unambiguously increases the MCF
and, consequently, the welfare cost of providing public goods becomes higher than previously
estimated. Alternatively, one could think of the previous analyses as aggregate frameworks
where the participation eﬀect — although not explicitly modelled — is embodied in a macro
labor supply function. For the estimation of MCF in the traditional approach, one should
then use the aggregate labor supply elasticity including both margins of labor supply response.
In this interpretation, our contribution is to demonstrate that the previous studies make a
measurement error because they use the wrong wedge, namely the marginal tax rate instead of
the sum of the average tax rate and the replacement ratio. Indeed, the measurement error thus
committed would be quite large for most realistic tax systems.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 derives our revised measure of the
marginal cost of public funds. Section 3 brieﬂy reviews the empirical evidence on extensive
and intensive labor supply responses. Section 4 describes the tax/beneﬁt data, while Section 5
presents calculations of the MCF for 23 OECD countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Revised Measure of the Marginal Cost of Public Funds
A way to account for labor supply responses along the participation margin, employed in the
empirical labor market literature, is to introduce ﬁxed costs of working into the analysis. These
are costs such as child care or commuting costs which must be paid for any amount of work.
We assume that the economy consists of a continuum of individuals who diﬀer with respect to
4their ﬁxed costs of working. The ﬁxed cost is denoted by ω and, since it is the only source of
heterogeneity, it is also used as the index parameter. Let c(ω) denote the consumption of type
ω,a n dl e tl(ω) denote the hours of work. Individual utility is then given by
u(ω)=
(
v(c(ω),1 − l(ω)) − ω for l(ω) > 0
v(c(ω),1) for l(ω)=0 .
(1)
In the case of labor market participation, the worker incurs the ﬁxed utility cost ω and has
leisure time 1 − l(ω). If the worker chooses to stay out of the labor force, he saves the ﬁxed
cost and gains leisure time. The budget constraint may be written as
c(ω) ≤ wl(ω) − T (wl(ω),z)+y, (2)
where w denotes the before-tax wage rate and y is non-labor income. The T-function is the
net payment to the public sector, including both taxes and transfers, and z is a parameter
which captures policy reform. The tax/transfer system may be proportional, progressive, or
regressive, and it may involve non-linearities. Attention is restricted, however, to the case of
piecewise linearity such that marginal rates are locally constant.
The household maximizes (1) subject to (2). In the case of participation, i.e. l(ω) > 0, the
optimum is characterized by
(1 − m(z))wv1 (cp,1 − lp)=v2 (cp,1 − lp), (3)
where cp and lp denote consumption and hours of work for a participating worker, while m(z) ≡
∂T (wlp,z)/∂ (wlp) is his marginal tax rate.
For the individual to enter the labor market in the ﬁrst place, the utility from participation
must be greater than or equal to the utility from non-participation. This implies the following
upper bound on the ﬁxed cost of working:
ω ≤ v(cp,1 − lp) − v(cn,1) ≡ ˜ ω (4)
5where cn = y − T (0,z) is the consumption for non-participants. Individuals with a ﬁxed
cost below the threshold-value ˜ ω decide to work lp hours, while those with a ﬁxed cost above
the threshold choose to stay outside the labor force. Letting the ﬁxed cost ω be distributed
according to the density function g(ω), the fraction of individuals who choose to participate in
the labor market is given by
R ˜ ω




l(ω)g (ω)dω = lpG(˜ ω), (5)
where we have normalized the total population to one. Aggregate labor supply is a product
of hours of work for those who are working and the labor force participation rate. Hence,
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage rate may be written as a sum of the









= η + δ. (6)
Note that η is the uncompensated hours-of-work elasticity. From the Slutsky-equation, it may
be decomposed into a compensated elasticity, ηc,a n da ni n c o m ee ﬀect, θ,t h a ti s
η = ηc − θ ≷ 0, (7)
where θ ≡−(1 − m(z))w
dlp
dy is positive if leisure is a normal good. Using (2) through (4), the









[1 − m(z)]lpv1 > 0, (8)
where we have suppressed the arguments in the marginal utility of income, v1. It is seen from
the above expression that the participation elasticity is strictly positive, in contrast to the
hours-of-work elasticity which has an indeterminate sign reﬂecting that the individual labor
supply curve may be backward-bending.
6For the purpose of measuring the eﬃciency eﬀects of raising revenue, we derive aggregate











Now, consider a policy reform, i.e. a marginal change in z, which raises additional revenue from
the labor income tax without aﬀecting the tax/transfer payments for those outside the labor


















w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tdcn/dz = −∂T (0,z)/∂z =0 . T h eﬁrst term measures the welfare
eﬀect of increased taxation for those staying in the labor market, while the second term captures
the eﬀect of people leaving the labor force. For the marginal worker, the utility of participation
equals that of non-participation, cf. eq. (4), and therefore the second term vanishes. Moreover,








where a(wlp,z) ≡ T (wlp,z)/(wlp) is the average tax rate, and where ∂a
∂z ≡ ∂T
∂z /(wlp)i st h e
change in the average tax rate following the reform.2 We are interested in the marginal cost of













2In calculations of the marginal welfare eﬀect, the choice of welfare measure does not matter. Thus, the
welfare eﬀect in equation (10) is consistent with all the common measures, for example the equivalent variation,
the compensating variation, and the compensating surplus. See Fullerton (1991) for a discussion of these issues.

















where b ≡− T (0,z)/(wlp) is the amount of transfers to those outside the labor force in pro-
portion to gross wages (the replacement ratio). The direct eﬀect of raising the average tax
burden on labor income is of course to collect more revenue from workers, reﬂected by the ﬁrst
term in the square brackets. However, there are feedback eﬀects from both margins of labor
supply. The second term in the square brackets reﬂects that those staying in the labor market
re-optimize their hours of work due to the reform. Moreover, some people choose to quit their
jobs because of the higher average tax rate, as indicated by the last term. This reduces tax
revenue and implies also higher aggregate transfer payments. Using eqs (2) through (8), the




































∂a/∂z measures the progressivity of the tax change. Notice that Φ reﬂects the
ex ante policy change, i.e., the feed-back from behavioral changes to tax rates is not included
in this parameter. The implication of accounting for participation responses is reﬂected by
the last term in the denominator, while the remaining part of the expression is the ‘standard’
eﬀect operating through the intensive margin. As demonstrated by several other studies, the
hours-of-work eﬀect depends on the marginal tax rate, the progressivity of the reform, as well
8as substitution and income eﬀects on individual labor supply. The size of the participation
eﬀect, on the other hand, is inﬂuenced by the average tax rate, the replacement ratio, and the
participation elasticity. The presence of this new term unambiguously increases the magnitude
of MCF.3
An obvious question to ask is whether the incorporation of extensive labor supply responses
is really trivial in the sense that it boils down to a reinterpretation of the elasticities in the
standard framework. The expression in (15) demonstrates clearly that this is not the case.
Firstly, the standard term is divided into an income eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect, weighted
by the reform parameter, and there is no obvious way to assign the participation eﬀect to one
or the other. Secondly, there is a diﬀerence in the relevant wedge as the participation term
depends on the average tax rate and the replacement ratio, rather than just the marginal tax
rate.
A natural benchmark, emphasized by e.g. Ballard and Fullerton (1992), is where the addi-
tional revenue is raised through a proportional tax change (Φ = 1) and where the uncompen-
sated hours-of-work elasticity is zero (η = 0). In this case the standard MCF is exactly equal








which is always greater than one. In fact, as we shall see in Section 5, it is substantially greater
3In comparing our MCF measure with previous studies, we run into the complication that quite a few dif-
ferent measures have been proposed. Indeed, the literature has devoted considerable eﬀort to comparing and
reconciling various MCF measures, see for example Snow and Warren (1996), and Dahlby (1998). One matter
creating disparities is that some studies assume decreasing returns to scale implying that before-tax wages be-
come endogenous (e.g. Mayshar, 1991). Moreover, some papers deﬁne the Φ-parameter to reﬂect the ex post
rather than the ex ante change in tax rates, as pointed out by Dahlby (1998). Correcting for these deviations, the
relationship between eq. (15) and some of the existing measures is as follows. For δ = 0, our result corresponds
to that of Mayshar (1991, eq. 3) and Dahlby (1998, eq. 11, single-person version). For δ =0a n dθ =0 ,w eg e t
Browning (1987, eq. 11). Finally, for δ =0a n dΦ = 1, our formula is equivalent to those of Wildasin (1984, eq.
16), Usher (1984, p. 409), and Mayshar (1991, eq. 1).
9than one for most OECD countries, assuming an empirically plausible participation elasticity.
Another interesting benchmark case is where the reform changes only average tax rates
(Φ = 0). Such a tax increase has a positive income eﬀect on the number of working hours,
provided that leisure is a normal good, and consequently the standard MCF is below one. In
our analysis there is an additional eﬀect since higher average taxes make it less attractive to







which may be greater than one.
3 Evidence on Intensive and Extensive Labor Supply Responses
A central ﬁnding of the modern labor market literature, surveyed by Heckman (1993), Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999), and Browning et al. (1999), is that most of the variation in labor
supply occurs along the extensive — rather than the intensive — margin. Thus, hours-of-work
responses are close to zero for most groups in the labor market. A benchmark scenario often
considered in the MCF literature is where the compensated hours-of-work elasticity is 0.2w h i l e
the uncompensated elasticity is 0 (e.g. Stuart, 1984; Mayshar, 1991; Ballard and Fullerton,
1992). We focus on the same benchmark case, in order to facilitate comparability, but consider
also other values.
Estimated participation responses are typically much larger, particularly for certain sub-
groups of the population. This is conﬁrmed by a number of studies of the Negative Income
Tax experiments in the United States, surveyed by e.g. Robins (1985). While participation
responses tend to be fairly small for prime age males, the elasticities for married women, single
female heads, and young people are typically in excess of 0.5 and sometimes close to unity.
10For example, in Ashenfelter’s (1978) study of the experiments in Iowa and North Carolina, the
elasticities for married males and females are 0.2a n d0 .9, respectively.
More recently, studies of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ﬁnd that the expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) has had large eﬀects on the labor force participation of single women,
especially for those with low education (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001). Even for women at the high end of the earnings distribution, Eissa (1995) ﬁnds that the
participation elasticity is as high as 0.4.
Non-experimental evidence for both the United States and Europe oﬀers a similar picture
(Mroz, 1987; Triest, 1990; Van Soest, 1995; Van Soest et al., 2002). Triest (1990) estimates that
the participation elasticity for married women in the United States lies in the interval from 0.6
to 1.1. For the Netherlands, Van Soest (1995) ﬁnds that the labor supply elasticity for males
lies in the interval from 0.1t o0 .2, whereas the elasticity for females lies in the range from 0.5t o
1.0. Although these elasticities include the eﬀect on both participation and hours, Van Soest’s
calculations reveal that, for both spouses, the principal eﬀect comes through the participation
response. A more recent study by Van Soest et al. (2002) suggests that the participation
elasticity for married women lies in the range from 0.5 (for those with high education) to 0.8
(for those with low education).
Applying these empirical studies to our analysis is not a straightforward exercise as they
all focus on various subgroups of the population while our MCF measure is based on a macro
elasticity. To summarize the literature, the participation elasticity for prime age males tends
to be small (perhaps around 0.1), while for females, low-income earners, and young people the
estimates tend to be concentrated in the interval from 1
2 to 1. Against this background, a
realistic value of the participation elasticity for the representative individual seems to be in the
11neighborhood of 0.2o r0 .3.
Another line of empirical work has dealt with the eﬀects of unemployment insurance and
other out-of-work beneﬁts on the incidence and duration of unemployment. A recent paper
by Kruger and Meyer (2002) surveys the evidence from the US and a number of other OECD
countries. They conclude that the estimated elasticities of lost work time with respect to
unemployment insurance tend to be around one. To become compatible with our participation
elasticity, this number have to be multiplied by the unemployment rate and divided by the net
replacement rate. For realistic magnitudes of the unemployment rate (5 to 10 percent) and the
net replacement rate (cf. the next section), the participation elasticity is 0.2o rm o r ef o rt h e
OECD countries which we consider.
Based on the evidence reviewed in this section, our MCF calculations use a macro elasticity
of labor market participation equal to 0.2. As this may be a bit conservative, we also consider
the implications of larger elasticities.
4 Taxes and Beneﬁts in OECD Countries
OECD’s detailed studies of tax and beneﬁt systems across member countries provide an ideal
basis for our comparative study of the marginal cost of public funds. Table I displays our
calculations, based on OECD data for the year 1999, of the tax/beneﬁt position of the average
production worker in 23 countries. The table considers a person who is single and without
children. The marginal and average tax rates which are used for the MCF calculations should
reﬂect the combined eﬀect of all taxes in reducing the net consumer wage below the marginal
product of labor. Accordingly, the tax rates in columns two and three include personal income
taxes, employees’ and employer’s compulsory social security contributions, together with any
12Table I. Tax and benefit rates for the average production worker in different OECD countries, year 1999
Country     Marginal      Average      Benefits Consumption     Marginal      Average      Benefits Avg.+Benefits
Australia 44.5 25.9 24.5 10.8 49.9 33.1 22.1 55.2
Austria 56.2 45.9 39.2 16.6 62.4 53.6 33.6 87.2
Belgium 67.3 56.9 26.1 15.7 71.7 62.7 22.6 85.3
Canada 47.3 31.1 17.6 11.7 52.8 38.3 15.8 54.1
Denmark 51.1 44.5 33.5 21.3 59.7 54.2 27.6 81.8
Finland 59.2 47.4 35.1 18.7 65.6 55.7 29.6 85.3
France 53.2 48.1 21.7 15.4 59.4 55.0 18.8 73.8
Germany 63.3 51.9 31.4 13.6 67.7 57.6 27.6 85.3
Greece 44.1 35.7 6.6 15.5 51.6 44.3 5.7 50.0
Iceland 39.0 24.2 39.7 18.4 48.5 36.0 33.5 69.5
Ireland 57.6 32.4 23.5 19.6 64.5 43.5 19.6 63.1
Italy 55.3 47.2 0.0 14.4 60.9 53.8 0.0 53.8
Japan 28.9 24.0 27.7 6.3 33.1 28.5 26.0 54.5
Luxembourg 49.2 34.6 37.1 18.0 56.9 44.6 31.5 76.0
Netherlands 58.2 44.3 38.8 16.0 64.0 52.0 33.4 85.4
New Zealand 21.0 19.4 31.4 16.1 31.9 30.6 27.1 57.6
Norway 43.0 37.3 30.4 21.9 53.2 48.5 24.9 73.5
Portugal 40.2 33.4 40.4 17.0 48.9 43.1 34.5 77.6
Spain 45.6 37.5 18.8 12.6 51.7 44.5 16.7 61.2
Sweden 52.4 50.5 35.6 14.8 58.5 56.9 31.0 87.9
Switzerland 38.2 29.8 42.3 8.0 42.8 35.0 39.1 74.2
United Kingdom 40.3 30.8 34.8 14.8 48.0 39.7 30.3 70.0
United States 34.9 31.1 5.2 5.8 38.5 34.9 4.9 39.8
Source: OECD (2000, 2001a,b) and authors' own calculations.
Tax and benefit rates Consumption-adjusted rates
Note: We consider the tax/benefit position of a single person with no children. The marginal and average tax rates in columns two and three include personal income taxes, employees' plus 
employer's compulsory social security contributions, and payroll taxes. The benefit level in column four is measured relative to the gross wage and includes those transfers obtainable by a long-
term benefit recipient. A long-term benefit recipient is defined as a person who has been out of employment for 60 months and who is not disqualified to obtain transfers due to any means tests. 
The consumption tax ratios are calculated as total consumption taxes in proportion to aggregate consumption (we have used the most recent estimates which are from 1996). Consumption-
adjusted tax rates are given by the formula (TR+CTR)/(1+CTR), where TR is the tax rate exclusive of consumption taxes and CTR is the consumption tax ratio. Finally, the consumption-
adjusted benefit rate is found by dividing the benefit rate by 1+CTR.payroll taxes. The tax rates account for the impact of various tax reliefs. This includes standard
reliefs, which are granted irrespective of actual expenses incurred by the taxpayer, as well as
certain reliefs for work-related expenses. Reliefs relating to for example interest on qualifying
loans, medical expenses, and charitable donations are not included. This seems defensible in
the present context as these reliefs are not related to the entry-exit decision per se.4
The tax rates should also account for the fact that commodity taxation reduces the real
consumer wage, thereby hampering the incentive to supply labor. Consumption tax ratios are
reported in column four and incorporated in the measure for average and marginal taxes in
columns ﬁve and six. These are the rates which are used for the MCF calculations. There is
substantial variation between countries, with marginal tax rates lying in the interval from 31.9
to 71.7 percent and average taxes in the range from 28.5t o6 2 .7 percent. For the United States,
for example, the marginal tax rate is 38.5 percent while the average tax rate is 34.9 percent.
Most calculations of the MCF for the United States have been based on the tax estimates of
Browning and Johnson (1984) for the year 1976, according to which the marginal tax rate is
42.7 percent and the average tax rate is 27.3 percent. The deviation of these tax rates from
those used here is explained partly by the tax reforms of the past 25 years. Moreover, the
Browning-Johnson estimates are really weighted averages of labor and capital taxes while our
tax rates include only that which is related to labor income.
The MCF depends also on out-of-work net income, consisting of UI beneﬁts, social assis-
4The estimated tax rates may not accurately capture the tax position of the representative individual. Al-
ternatively, we could have used tax rates based on aggregate data, also known as implicit tax rates, for example
calculated by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea (1997), and OECD (2001a).
However, this method presents some problems in our context. Firstly, it does not separate average from marginal
tax rates, which is an essential distinction for our purpose. Secondly, it is impossible to calculate the true tax
rate on labor income through the use of aggregate data, except for a few countries. Instead, the calculations
assume a similar tax treatment of labor and capital income (see OECD, 2001a, for a detailed discussion of this
issue). Consequently, the implicit average tax ratios do not necessarily capture the wedge which is relevant for
the decision to enter or exit the labor force.
13tance, housing beneﬁts, food stamps, etc. However, the inclusion of such beneﬁts raises some
conceptual issues. The beneﬁt levels reported by OECD may be overestimated for our purpose
because of eligibility rules (relating to wealth, spouse’s income, etc.) and because of workfare
requirements which reduce the utility of the beneﬁt recipient. In an attempt to handle this po-
tential bias, we consider two cases: one where beneﬁts are excluded altogether (a lower bound)
and another one where we use the lowest beneﬁt measure reported by OECD, namely that of
a long-term recipient. Net beneﬁt levels in proportion to gross wages are reported in columns
6 and 7, the latter column accounting for the eﬀect of consumption taxes on the real value
of out-of-work income. As with taxes, there is a great deal of variation. For example, in the
United States the replacement ratio (corrected for consumption taxes) is 4.9 percent while for
a number of European countries the ratio is above 30 percent. Finally, Table I reports the sum
of the average tax rate for workers and the beneﬁt ratio for non-workers, which is the wedge
r e l e v a n tf o rt h ed e c i s i o nt oe n t e ro re x i tt h el a b o rm a r k e t .
5 The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD Countries
We now have the information needed for the calculation of the MCF. In our benchmark sce-
nario, we set the compensated hours-of-work elasticity, ηc, and the income eﬀect, θ,e q u a lt o
0.2, implying an uncompensated elasticity equal to 0. Table II reports both the standard MCF
measure (disregarding participation eﬀects) and the revised MCF measure, based on a partici-
pation elasticity, δ,e q u a lt o0 .2. The results are reported for a proportional reform (Φ =1 ) ,a
regressive reform (Φ = 0), and a progressive reform (Φ =2 ) .
T h ec a s ew h e r et h ea d d i t i o n a lr e v e n u ei sr a i s e d by a proportional reform demonstrates very
clearly the implications of accounting for extensive labor supply responses. The standard MCF
14Table II. The marginal cost of public funds in OECD countries for different reforms
Country     Standard Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits     Standard Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits     Standard Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits
Australia 1.00 1.15 1.28 0.83 0.94 1.02 1.25 1.50 1.72
Austria 1.00 1.40 1.87 0.75 0.96 1.15 1.50 2.61 4.91
Belgium 1.00 1.80 2.52 0.66 0.94 1.11 2.03 20.49 -9.00
Canada 1.00 1.19 1.30 0.82 0.94 1.01 1.29 1.63 1.83
Denmark 1.00 1.37 1.68 0.77 0.97 1.12 1.42 2.30 3.36
Finland 1.00 1.48 1.98 0.72 0.95 1.13 1.62 3.40 8.19
France 1.00 1.37 1.57 0.77 0.98 1.08 1.41 2.30 2.92
Germany 1.00 1.55 2.12 0.70 0.94 1.12 1.72 4.46 18.75
Greece 1.00 1.22 1.26 0.82 0.97 0.99 1.27 1.66 1.72
Iceland 1.00 1.16 1.37 0.84 0.95 1.09 1.23 1.49 1.85
Ireland 1.00 1.32 1.55 0.73 0.89 0.99 1.57 2.56 3.57
Italy 1.00 1.38 1.38 0.76 0.97 0.97 1.45 2.42 2.42
Japan 1.00 1.09 1.19 0.91 0.99 1.07 1.11 1.23 1.36
Luxembourg 1.00 1.26 1.55 0.79 0.95 1.10 1.36 1.89 2.61
Netherlands 1.00 1.41 1.90 0.74 0.94 1.14 1.55 2.81 5.85
New Zealand 1.00 1.10 1.20 0.91 1.00 1.08 1.10 1.22 1.36
Norway 1.00 1.26 1.46 0.81 0.98 1.09 1.29 1.77 2.18
Portugal 1.00 1.20 1.44 0.84 0.98 1.13 1.24 1.56 1.98
Spain 1.00 1.23 1.34 0.82 0.97 1.04 1.27 1.66 1.88
Sweden 1.00 1.38 1.74 0.78 0.99 1.16 1.39 2.26 3.41
Switzerland 1.00 1.14 1.35 0.87 0.97 1.12 1.18 1.37 1.69
United Kingdom 1.00 1.18 1.37 0.84 0.97 1.09 1.23 1.51 1.83
United States 1.00 1.13 1.15 0.89 0.99 1.00 1.14 1.31 1.34
Source: OECD (2000, 2001a,b) and authors' own calculations.
Regressive reform (Φ  = 0) Progressive reform (Φ  = 2) Proportional reform (Φ  = 1)
Note: MCF is calculated from equation (16) using the tax and beneft rates reported in Table I. The compensated hours-of-work elasticity (η
c) and the income effect (θ ) are equal to 0.2, implying an uncompensated 
elasticity (η ) equal to 0. The standard MCF measure is calculated by setting the participation elasticity (δ)  equal to 0. The benefit-exclusive MCF and the benefit-inclusive MCF are derived for a participation 
elasticity equal to 0.2.measure is exactly one. By contrast, the revised MCF lies in the interval from 1.15 to 2.52 if
out-of-work beneﬁts are accounted for, while the interval is 1.09 to 1.80 if beneﬁts are excluded.
At the low end of the scale, United States has a beneﬁt-inclusive MCF equal to 1.15 while
the beneﬁt-exclusive value is 1.13. Other countries with relatively low MCFs include Japan,
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In the high end, we ﬁnd continental European
countries such as Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. For
example, the MCF for Germany is equal to 2.12 or 1.55 depending on whether beneﬁts are
included or not. In France the values of MCF are somewhat lower, namely 1.57 and 1.37.
Another interesting case is where the reform changes only average taxes, corresponding to a
change in basic allowances or credits. As emphasized by Fullerton (1991), the standard MCF is
always lower than one in this case due to the income eﬀect on hours of work. Indeed, for Φ =0
the table indicates that the standard MCF is below 0.9 for almost all countries. Accounting for
participation eﬀects, the beneﬁt-exclusive MCF is close to one for a majority of countries and,
once beneﬁts are included, the MCF is greater than one for nearly all countries.
If revenue is raised through a progressive reform, the MCF becomes larger. In the table
this is demonstrated for the case of Φ = 2 corresponding, for example, to an increase in the
tax rate applying to the upper half of income. Even where beneﬁts are not included, the MCF
is greater than 2 for around half of the countries in the sample. By construction, the MCF
tends to inﬁnity as the economy approaches the maximum of the Laﬀer curve and becomes
negative thereafter. Our estimates indicate that the reform is quite close to generating Laﬀer
curve eﬀects in some countries. For example, the beneﬁt-exclusive MCF is higher than 20 for
Belgium while the number is above 4 in Germany. If out-of-work net income is included, it
turns out that Belgium is beyond the Laﬀer curve’s maximum, while several other countries are
15close to the maximum as indicated by excessive MCF-values.
Table III gives an impression of the sensitivity of MCF to diﬀerent assumptions about labor
supply elasticities. In the table, we consider only proportional reforms. As the participation
elasticity used above may be somewhat conservative, columns one through four consider the
implications of higher elasticity estimates. If the participation elasticity is 0.3, instead of 0.2,
the beneﬁt-inclusive MCF in the United States increases from 1.15 to 1.24. For countries with
higher average taxes and government transfers, the eﬀect of raising the participation elasticity
is more dramatic. The MCF is more than doubled for Germany while in Belgium the number is
quadrupled. Increasing the participation elasticity to 0.4, these two countries pass the maximum
of the Laﬀer curve (negative MCF), while countries like Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands
get MCFs in excess of 10. Finally, the remaining columns consider alternative values of the
uncompensated hours-of-work elasticity (η equal to 0.1a n d−0.1). As for the participation
elasticity, the sensitivity of MCF with respect to the hours-of-work elasticity is largest for those
countries having relatively high taxes. In contrast to the participation elasticity, however, it is
the marginal — rather than the average — tax rate which matters for the sensitivity.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Our knowledge of labor supply behavior is subject to a good deal of uncertainty. Nonetheless, it
seems to be the consensus that most of the variation in labor supply stems from decisions about
entry and exit, and to a much lesser extent from changes in the hours of work for those who
are working. This view carries important implications for tax policy. On a theoretical level, the
welfare cost of raising revenue becomes a function of average tax levels and out-of-work income,
rather than just marginal taxes as in the existing measures. Moreover, our calculations for
16Table III. The marginal cost of public funds in OECD countries for different labor supply elasticities
Country Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits Excl. benefits  Incl. benefits
Australia 1.25 1.49 1.36 1.79 1.30 1.47 1.03 1.14
Austria 1.75 3.29 2.33 13.88 1.82 2.70 1.14 1.42
Belgium 2.99 10.59 8.90 -4.82 3.31 7.01 1.23 1.54
Canada 1.32 1.52 1.48 1.85 1.38 1.52 1.05 1.13
Denmark 1.68 2.56 2.16 5.32 1.72 2.24 1.14 1.35
Finland 1.94 3.91 2.84 128.95 2.06 3.19 1.15 1.44
France 1.69 2.20 2.19 3.68 1.72 2.04 1.14 1.28
Germany 2.15 4.80 3.49 -18.01 2.31 3.81 1.17 1.47
Greece 1.38 1.45 1.58 1.70 1.41 1.46 1.08 1.11
Iceland 1.27 1.68 1.39 2.17 1.31 1.57 1.05 1.21
Ireland 1.58 2.15 1.96 3.47 1.75 2.16 1.07 1.21
Italy 1.70 1.70 2.23 2.23 1.76 1.76 1.14 1.14
Japan 1.15 1.32 1.21 1.48 1.16 1.27 1.04 1.13
Luxembourg 1.45 2.13 1.71 3.40 1.51 1.94 1.08 1.28
Netherlands 1.76 3.46 2.36 19.24 1.87 2.87 1.12 1.42
New Zealand 1.16 1.34 1.22 1.51 1.16 1.28 1.04 1.14
Norway 1.45 1.89 1.71 2.69 1.47 1.75 1.10 1.25
Portugal 1.34 1.84 1.51 2.55 1.36 1.67 1.08 1.26
Spain 1.38 1.61 1.58 2.03 1.41 1.56 1.08 1.17
Sweden 1.70 2.75 2.22 6.58 1.71 2.30 1.15 1.39
Switzerland 1.22 1.64 1.32 2.08 1.25 1.50 1.05 1.23
United Kingdom 1.30 1.68 1.44 2.17 1.32 1.57 1.06 1.21
United States 1.21 1.24 1.29 1.35 1.21 1.24 1.05 1.07
Source: OECD (2000, 2001a,b) and authors' own calculations.
Note: MCF is calculated from equation (16) using the tax and beneft rates reported in Table I. We consider a proportional tax reform (Φ =1). Under this reform, the decomposition of the 
uncompensated hours-of-work elasticity (η)  into a compensated elasticity (η
c) and an income effect (θ)  is irrelevant for the MCF.
Variation in the participation elasticity Variation in the hours-of-work elasticity
δ  = 0.3 and η  = 0 δ  = 0.4 and η  = 0 δ  = 0.2 and η  = 0.1 δ  = 0.2 and η  = -0.1OECD countries indicate that the costs of ﬁnancing public goods become considerably higher
once participation responses are accounted for.
Although our paper is concerned primarily with the level of taxation, the analysis has
interesting implications for the composition of taxation. The empirical labor market literature
demonstrates clearly that participation elasticities are substantially larger for low-wage earners
than for high-wage earners. This implies, ceteris paribus, that the raising of labor taxes on
low-wage earners involves a relatively high MCF. This suggests an eﬃciency-based argument
for low tax burdens at the bottom of the wage-distribution, for example through the use of an
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Such a conclusion clashes with the existing MCF literature
where tax increases in lower brackets carry a large element of lump sum taxation implying a
low value for MCF, a point emphasized by Dahlby (1998). Our point is instead in line with
that of Saez (2000) who extends the theory of optimal income taxation to incorporate both
intensive and extensive labor supply responses. His analysis demonstrates that, when labor
supply responses are concentrated on the extensive margin, the optimum involves an EITC
with negative tax rates for low-wage earners. All in all, our analysis and that of Saez indicate
that the distinction between the two margins of labor supply response is important for both
the level and the composition of taxation.
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Eq. (14) is obtained by deriving the two derivatives d˜ ω/dz and dlp/dz and inserting them into










w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tdcn/dz = −∂T (0,z)/∂z = 0. Using the budget constraint (2) to
derive dcp/dz, the above relationship becomes
d˜ ω
dz







w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a t∂a/∂z ≡
∂T/∂z
wlp . Finally, due to the ﬁrst order condition with respect







We next derive dlp/dz.N o t eﬁrst that the budget constraint may be rewritten to
cp =( 1− m(z))wlp + I,
where I ≡ m(z)wlp−T (wlp,z)+y is the so-called virtual income. This expression and eq. (3)
imply that the optimal number of working hours may be written as a function of the marginal
net-of-tax wage and the virtual income, i.e.
lp = lp ((1 − m(z))w,I).
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where we have used the Slutsky-equation (7) and the deﬁnition of θ.
Finally, by inserting (18) and (19) in eq. (13) and using (8), we obtain eq. (14). QED.
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